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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the optimal investment policy of the ﬁrm which is
ﬁnanced by issuing equity, straight debt and convertible debt with the senior-sub
structure. The senior-sub structure gives preference to straight debt over convertible
debt and to convertible debt over equity when the default occurs. We investigate
how the senior-sub structure aﬀects the optimal policies for default, conversion and
investment the values of equity, straight debt, convertible debt and investment. In
particular, we show that the senior-sub structure for the equity, the straight debt
and the convertible debt leads to the accelerating conversion, decreases the values
of convertible debt and investment, and does not really aﬀect the default and the
investment.
Keywords: Convertible debt, senior-sub structure, conversion threshold, investment
timing, real options
1 Introduction
Issuance of convertible debt is an important means of debt ﬁnancing for ﬁrms. In recent
years, ﬁrms issuing the subordinated convertible debt have been common. The senior-sub
structure gives preference to straight debt over convertible debt and to convertible debt
over equity when the default occurs. Black and Cox [1] and Sundaresan and Wang [8]
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1suppose that the holder of junior security will not get paid at all until the holders of
senior security are completely paid oﬀ at default. The straight debt holders which get
the most preference over the other security holders either are guaranteed the par price or
receive the total recovery value of the ﬁrm at default time. Next, the convertible debt
holders are guaranteed the payments at default. They receive either the par price or the
remaining value calculated by subtracting the par price of straight debt from the total
recovery value of the ﬁrm. If the remaining value is negative, the convertible debt holders
cannot receive nothing at default. Under the senior-sub structure equity holders cannot
receive nothing if the remaining value calculated by subtracting the par prices of straight
debt and convertible debt from the total recovery value of the ﬁrm is negative at default.
There are some previous works for the optimal problem for the investment which
is ﬁnanced with equity, straight debt and convertible debt. Lyandres and Zhdanov [4]
have demonstrated the feature of outstanding convertible debt to induce shareholders to
accelerate the issuance of new equity to ﬁnance investment thus alleviating the underin-
vestment problem of Myers [6]. Yagi et al. [7] have examined two diﬀerent investment
policies that maximize the equity value and the ﬁrm value and show the agency cost as the
diﬀerence between policy values. They have investigated how the issuance of convertible
debt aﬀects investment. Egami [3] has analyzed optimal strategies involved in convert-
ible debt ﬁnanced expansion problem and clariﬁed how the conversion feature aﬀects the
equity holders’ investment decisions. However, these studies assume the same priority of
straight debt and convertible debt.
Our study examines the investment option exercising decision by equity when the
investment is partially ﬁnanced with convertible and straight debt with the senior-sub
structure. We investigate how the senior-sub structure aﬀects the optimal policies for
default, conversion and investment the values of equity, straight debt, convertible debt
and investment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec. 2 describes the model.
In Sec. 3, we derive the solution by numerical calculations and provide some results of
numerical analysis. Finally, Sec. 4 summarizes this paper.
2 The Model
We consider a ﬁrm with an option to invest at any time by paying a ﬁxed investment
cost I. The ﬁrm partially ﬁnances the cost of investment with straight debt with the
instantaneous contractual coupon payment of s and inﬁnite maturity, and convertible
debt with coupon payment of c and inﬁnite maturity. These coupon payments are tax-
deductible at a constant corporate tax rate τ. We suppose that the ﬁrm observes the
2demand shock Xt for its product, where Xt is given by a geometric Brownian motion
dXt = µXtdt + σXtdWt, X0 = x, (2.1)
µ and σ are the risk-adjusted expected growth rate and the volatility of Xt, respectively,
and Wt is a standard Brownian motion deﬁned on a probability space (Ω,F,P). After
the investment option is exercised, we assume that the ﬁrm can receive the instantaneous
proﬁt
π(Xt,s,c) = (1 − τ)(QXt − s − c) (2.2)
where Q > 0 is the quantity produced from the asset in place.
In order to examine the eﬀects of senior-sub structure for straight debt and convertible
debt, we consider several settings. First, we present a benchmark model in which the in-
vestment is ﬁnanced with all equity. Second, we examine the case in which the investment
is ﬁnanced with equity, straight debt and convertible debt with the same priority. Finally,
we consider a ﬁrm with an option for investment to be ﬁnanced with equity, straight debt
and convertible debt with the senior-sub structure.
2.1 All-Equity Financing
In this section, we assume that the investment is ﬁnanced entirely with equity. This case
has been investigated for real options (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck [2] and McDonald and
Siegel [5]). The optimal investment rule is to exercise the investment option at the ﬁrst
passage time of the stochastic shock to an upper threshold x∗. The value of the investment



























σ2 > 1 and  (x) is the total post-investment proﬁt in





2.2 Equity, Straight Debt, and Convertible Debt Financing
Next, we consider the investment which is ﬁnanced with equity, straight debt and con-
vertible debt.
32.2.1 Optimal Investment Policy
The equity holders of the ﬁrm which invests selects the optimal investment timing, ob-
serving the demand shock Xt. Let E(x), Ds(x) and Dc(x) be the values of equity, straight
debt and convertible debt issued at the investment, respectively. Then, the ﬁrm value
V (x) is represented by
V (x) = E(x) + Ds(x) + Dc(x). (2.6)
Letting Tt1,t2 be the set of stopping times with respect to the ﬁltration as {Fs;t1 ≤ s ≤ t2}
and T > 0 be an investment time, the value of the investment partially ﬁnanced with





















t is the conditional expectation operator upon Xt = x and r is the risk-free
interest rate. The optimal investment time T ∗ is given by
T
∗ = inf{T ∈ [0,∞) | XT ≥ x
∗}. (2.8)
From Eq. (2.7), the value of the investment option is given by
F(x) = a0x
β1 (2.9)
for x < x∗. A constant a0 and the investment threshold x∗ must be determined using the
following value matching and smooth-pasting conditions:
F(x
∗) = V (x









2.2.2 The Values of Equity, Straight Debt and Convertible Debt with the
Same Priority
In this section we examine the values of equity, straight debt and convertible debt with
the same priority, introduced in Egami [3], Lyandres and Zhdanov [4] and Yagi et al. [7].
We assume that the holders of convertible debt can convert the debt into a fraction η of
the original equity, where η = αc and α is a constant.
Once the investment option has been exercised, the optimal default policy is estab-
lished from the issue of debt. The optimal default strategy of the equity holders maximizes
the equity value, selecting the default threshold xd. In this section we assume that equity
4holders cannot receive nothing at default. The holders of convertible debt receive the
continuous coupon payment of c and choose the optimal conversion threshold xc, maxi-
mizing the value of convertible debt. Since straight debt and convertible debt have the
same priority, the holders of straight debt are entitled to s
s+c(1−θ) (x) at pre-conversion
bankruptcy and (1 − θ) (x) at post-conversion bankruptcy. Similarly, the convertible
debt holders are entitled to c
s+c(1 − θ) (x) at pre-conversion bankruptcy, where θ is the
proportional bankruptcy cost, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.
We now model the values of equity, straight debt and convertible debt after the in-
vestment option has been exercised. Let Td be the pre-conversion default time. The total












































where the optimal default and conversion times T ∗
d and T ∗
c , respectively, are given by
T
∗
d = inf{Td ∈ [t,∞) | XTd ≤ xd}, (2.14)
T
∗
c = inf{Tc ∈ [t,∞) | XTc ≥ xc} (2.15)
and 1{T∗
c <Td} is an indicator function that is equal to one if T ∗
c < Td and is equal to zero
otherwise. Ea(x) is the total value of equity after conversion. Eq. (2.12) implies that
the equity holders can receive the tax-deductible earning after paying coupon payments
until conversion or default and that the equity value is diluted by converting, that is, 1
1+η
represents the dilution factor. Eq. (2.13) means that the convertible debt holders can
receive the coupon payment c until conversion or default and a fraction η of the original
equity on conversion, and are entitled to the unleveraged value of the net proportional
bankruptcy cost, (1 − θ) (x), of the ﬁrm at bankruptcy.
Next we consider the value of straight debt. Since the holders of straight debt can
receive the continuous coupon payment of s, the value of the straight debt at investment

























where Ds,a(x) is the total value of straight debt after conversion. Eq. (2.16) means that
the straight debt holders can receive the coupon payment until default and are entitled
to a fraction of te unlevered value of the ﬁrm at bankruptcy.
Once the convertible debt has been converted, the ﬁrm becomes an entity that issues
equity and straight debt, and the new optimal default policy is established. Using standard
arguments of real options framework, the post-conversion default threshold xd,c, the equity





























− (1 − θ) (xd,c)
)
, (2.19)











Next, we consider the values prior to conversion. It follows from the optimal problems
of the equity holders, straight debt holders, and convertible debt holders in (2.12), (2.16),
and (2.13), respectively, that the values of equity, straight debt, and convertible debt prior
to default and conversion are given by
E(x) = a1x
β1 + a2x





















Constants ai, i = 1,··· ,6, the default threshold xd, and the conversion threshold xc must
6be determined using the following value matching and smooth-pasting conditions:
E(xd) = 0, (2.23)
dE
dx
































Eqs. (2.23), (2.24), (2.26) and (2.28) are conditions in default. On the other hand,
Eqs. (2.25), (2.27), (2.29) and (2.30) are conditions in conversion. Eq. (2.23) is the
value matching condition that ensures that the equity value at the default threshold
equals zero. Eq. (2.24) is the smooth-pasting condition that ensures the optimality of
the default threshold xd. Eqs. (2.26) and (2.28) are the value matching conditions that
ensure that the values of debt are equal to respective fractions of the unlevered value of
the ﬁrm net of proportional bankruptcy cost. Eq. (2.25) is the value matching condition
requiring that the value of equity at the conversion threshold equal a proportion of the
post-conversion value of equity given in Eq. (2.18). Eq. (2.27) is the value matching condi-
tion that ensures that the pre-conversion value of straight debt equals the post-conversion
value of straight debt in Eq. (2.19). Equation (2.29) is the value matching condition that
ensures that the value of the convertible debt at the conversion threshold is equal to a pro-
portion of the post-conversion value of equity. Eq. (2.30) is the smooth-pasting condition
that ensures the optimality of the conversion threshold xc. Eqs. (2.23)-(2.30) have eight
unknown variables (ai,i = 1,··· ,6,xd,xc). These equations can be solved numerically.
2.2.3 The Values of Equity, Straight Debt and Convertible Debt with the
Senior-Sub Structure
In this section we examine the values of equity, straight debt and convertible debt with
the senior-sub structure. The senior-sub structure gives preference to straight debt over
convertible debt and to convertible debt over equity when the default occurs. As in Black
and Cox [1] and Sundaresan and Wang [8], we suppose that the holder of junior security
will not get paid at all until the holders of senior security are completely paid oﬀ at
7default.
At the pre-conversion default time Td, the straight debt holders receive
Ds(XTd) = min(Fs,(1 − θ) (XTd)), (2.31)
where Fs is the par value of the straight debt and is equal to Fs = Ds(x∗). The payoﬀ
function (2.31) means that the straight debt holders receive either Fs or the total recovery
value of the ﬁrm (1 − θ) (xd) at default time Td.
On the other hand, at the pre-conversion default time Td, the convertible debt holders
receive
Dc(XTd) = min(Fc,max((1 − θ) (XTd) − Fs,0)). (2.32)
Let Fc denote the par value of convertible debt issued at investment time. The convertible
debt is also issued at par, and thus we have Fc = Dc(x∗). The payoﬀ function (2.32)
implies that the convertible debt holders receive either Fc or the remaining value calculated
by subtracting the par price of straight debt from the total recovery value of the ﬁrm. If
the remaining value is negative, the convertible debt holders cannot receive nothing at
default.
Furthermore, under the senior-sub structure equity holders can receive
E(XTd) = max((1 − θ) (XTd) − Fs − Fc,0) (2.33)
at default. The payoﬀ function (2.33) represents the equity holders cannot receive noth-
ing if the remaining value calculated by subtracting the par prices of straight debt and
convertible debt from the total recovery value of the ﬁrm is negative at default.
When the equity, the straight debt and the convertible debt have the senior-sub struc-



























where Ea(x) is the post-conversion value of equity. The values of convertible debt and

























































where Ds,a(x) is the post-conversion value of straight debt.

















This equation means that the equity holders cannot receive nothing if the remaining value
calculated by subtracting the par price of straight debt from the total recovery value of
the ﬁrm is negative at default. The optimal post-conversion default time is given by
T
∗
d,c = inf{Td,c ∈ [t,∞) | XTd,c ≤ xd,c}. (2.38)

















This equation represents that the straight debt holders can receive the coupon payment
until default and are entitled to either the par price or a fraction of the unlevered value of
the ﬁrm at bankruptcy. From Eqs. (2.37) and (2.39), the post-conversion values of equity
and straight debt are given by
Ea(x) = a7x














9Constants ai, i = 7,8 and the post-conversion default threshold xd,c are determined from
the following value matching and smooth-pasting conditions:



























The pre-conversion values of equity, straight debt and convertible debt are given by
Eqs. (2.20), (2.21) and (2.22), respectively. Hence, we must determine constants ai,
i = 1,··· ,6 and the pre-conversion default and conversion thresholds. The value match-
ing condition and the smooth-pasting conditions in default and conversion are given by

























∗),(1 − θ) (xd)), (2.48)
Ds(xc) = Ds,a(xc), (2.49)
Dc(xd) = min(Dc(x














Since Eqs. (2.42)–(2.43), (2.45)–(2.46), (2.48) and (2.50) include the optimal investment
threshold x∗, Eqs. (2.7)-(2.8) which determine the value of investment option, the pre-
conversion values of equity and straight debt, and the post-conversion values of equity,
straight debt and convertible debt must be also solved, simultaneously. Since Eqs. (2.7)–
(2.8), (2.42)–(2.52) have 13 unknown variables (ai,i = 0,··· ,8,x∗,xd,c,xd,xc), these equa-
tions are solved numerically.
3 Numerical Analysis
In this section, the calculation results of the value of equity, each debt, and the invest-
ment option are presented in order to investigate how the senior-sub structure aﬀects the
optimal policies for default, conversion and investment. We use the following base case
10parameters: Q = 1, µ = 0, σ = 0.2, r = 0.05, I = 20, c = 1, α = 1.5, θ = 0.3, and
τ = 0.3.
Figs. 1 and 2 show the values of equity, straight debt, and convertible debt, as functions
of the demand shock x in the case of Sec. 2.2.3, that is, the investment is ﬁnanced with
equity, straight debt, and convertible debt with the senior-sub structure. The solid line
depicts the equity value E(x), the dotted line represents that of straight debt, and the
dash-dotted line gives that of convertible debt, respectively. The coupon payment for
straight debt in Fig. 1 is equal to s = 0.2 and that in Fig. 2 is equal to s = 1. The
coupon payment for convertible debt in both ﬁgures is equal to c = 1. In both these
parameters the equity holders cannot receive nothing at default. As shown in these
ﬁgures, the threshold values for the pre-conversion default and the conversion are 0.69
and 2.15 in Fig. 1, and 1.18 and 2.32 in Fig. 2, respectively. When the coupon payment
for straight debt s is relatively low, the issued price (the par value) of straight debt Ds(x∗)
is also low. Then, since the straight debt holders are completely paid oﬀ at default, the
convertible debt holders can receive the ﬁrm value minus the par value of straight debt
(1−θ) (xd)−Ds(x∗) > 0, that is, the value of convertible debt has the non-negative value
at the default threshold xd in Fig. 1. On the other hand, when the coupon payment for
straight debt is relatively high, the par value of straight debt is also high. Then, since the
payoﬀ to straight debt holders is not completely guaranteed, the convertible debt holders
cannot receive nothing at default, that is, the value of convertible debt is equal to zero in
Fig 2.
Tab. 1 shows the optimal default threshold values xd for the fraction of coupon payment
for straight debt s
s+c when the coupon payment for convertible debt is equal to c = 1.
The upper row represents the default threshold in the case of the senior-sub structure in
Sec. 2.2.3 and the lower row represents that in the case of the same priority in Sec. 2.2.2. In
both the cases, we may recognize that the default occurs earlier when the coupon payment
for straight debt is higher. Furthermore, we can conﬁrm that the senior-sub structure for
straight debt and convertible debt does not really aﬀect the default threshold because the
value of equity which is used in the selection of the default is unaﬀected directly.
Fig. 3 presents th optimal conversion threshold xc for the fraction of coupon payment
for straight debt s
s+c. The solid line represents the threshold in the case of the senior-sub
structure and the dotted line gives that in the case of the same priority, respectively.
When the coupon payment for straight debt is high, the conversion occurs earlier because
the convertible debt holders cannot receive nothing at default. Meanwhile, as the coupon
payment for straight debt becomes lower, the eﬀect of accelerating the conversion is weak-
ening because the convertible debt holders can receive the positive value. Furthermore,
in Tab. 1, we can see that the default occurs earlier because the conversion occurs earlier
when straight debt and convertible debt have the senior-sub structure.
Tab. 2 shows the optimal investment threshold values x∗ for s
s+c. In both the cases, we
11may recognize that the ﬁrm invests at the high investment threshold in order to prevent the
default from occurring because the default threshold is higher when the coupon payment
for straight debt is higher. We can make sure that the senior-sub structure does not really
aﬀect the investment threshold similarly to the default threshold because the ﬁrm value
which is used in the selection of the investment is unaﬀected directly. However, we can
see that the investment delays because the default occurs earlier when the equity, the
straight debt and the convertible debt have the senior-sub structure.
Finally, in Fig. 4 we show the value of investment F(x) for the fraction of the coupon
payment for straight debt when x = 2. In both the senior-sub structure and the same
priority, when the coupon payment for straight debt is low, the value of investment is low
because the ﬁrm value is also low. On the other hand, as the coupon payment for straight
debt becomes higher, the value of investment is lower because the default threshold is
lower for x = 2. We can see in this ﬁgure that the value of convertible debt decreases and
then the value of investment is lower since the conversion occurs earlier when the equity,
the straight debt and the convertible debt have the senior-sub structure.




s+c 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
senior-sub structure 0.6363 0.7211 0.8310 0.9776 1.1806 1.4906
same priority 0.6359 0.7197 0.8283 0.9740 1.1759 1.4843




s+c 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
senior-sub structure 2.2199 2.2376 2.2788 2.3588 2.5032 2.7703
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Figure 4: The value of investment F(x) for the fraction of coupon payment for straight
debt s
s+c (x = 2.0)
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the optimal investment policy of the ﬁrm ﬁnanced
by issuing equity, straight debt, and convertible debt with the senior-sub structure. The
values of equity, straight debt, and convertible debt after exercising the investment option
were shown. We also showed the threshold value for default, conversion and investment,
and the investment option value. In particular, we found that the senior-sub structure
for straight debt and convertible debt leads to the accelerating conversion, decreases the
values of convertible debt and investment, and does not really aﬀect the default and the
investment.
The trade-oﬀ in debt ﬁnancing is between the expected costs of bankruptcy and the
tax beneﬁt of debt. Straight debt is associated with both higher expected tax shields
and larger expected bankruptcy costs. Thus, it is conceivable that there is an interior
optimal capital structure, involving equity, straight debt, and convertible debt. In the
future, we would like to try to solve for this equilibrium which is subject to the debt
issued at par which is constant and analyze the sensitivity of its properties to various
model parameters.
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